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suggests that the operational hedging ability of the firm to address country risk (nationalization threats) is 
related to the level of its intangible assets. While it is well known that firms with high levels of intangible 
assets prefer foreign direct investment, our results show that intangible assets have hidden properties of 
protection against country risk as well. We document significantly negative abnormal returns only for 
divesting firms with low levels of intangible assets, but not for firms with high levels of intangible assets. In 
addition, we show that low (high) growth firms are involved in partial (complete) withdrawals, and show that 
the long-term economic performance of firms choosing the complete withdrawal strategy is better than those 
that opt to remain. We argue that management's attempt to maintain economic links in a hostile foreign 
environment can be attributed in part to the firm's low growth opportunities, performance, and lack of 
contingent plans to address country risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Department of Finance, Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012, School of 
Business and Public Administration, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529-0218, and Distinguished 
Senior Research Fellow, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff, UK,e-mail:jdoukas@stern.nyu.edu, Tel: (212) 
998-0432, and the Finance Department, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA 92182, respectively. We 
are grateful to Mark Flannery, Paul Seguin and Rene Stulz, and two anonymous referees for their helpful 
comments. 
 1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The period between 1960 and 1980 witnessed a spate of forced nationalizations of U.S. based 
multinationals. It is generally believed that this type of action by a host country represents the 
extreme form of country risk and can conceivably be considered as “bad news” for firms with 
operations in hostile host countries. Consequently, one should expect share prices of such firms to 
drop when such announcements are first made. Share price declines would be consistent with 
market’s expectation of firm’s performance deterioration following the forced foreign divestiture 
announcement. However, in this paper, we provide evidence that is not entirely consistent with this 
conjecture. Even though firms are unlikely to be subject to such a severe form of country risk today, 
firms continue to operate under host-country pressures and risks. For instance, the Asian financial 
crisis illustrated the potential instability of these countries. Therefore, studying the short- and long-
term effects of forced selloffs associated with the nationalizations of the 1960-1980 period provide 
us with a unique opportunity to assess the role of corporate intangible assets as an “operational 
hedge” against varying levels of country risk, ranging from outright nationalizations to milder forms 
such as the recent Asian crisis.  
While the internalization theory states that high levels of corporate intangible assets motivate 
foreign direct investment, we argue that they have operational hedging properties against country 
risk as well. Surprisingly, this attribute of intangible assets remains largely unexplored. Consistent 
with our view that intangible assets can act as an operational hedge against country risk, Langohr and 
Viallet (1986) show that shareholders of nationalized firms during the 1981-1982 nationalizations 
gained substantially from the compulsory transfer of shares to the French government. Interestingly, 
however, these gains were found to be firm specific. Langohr and Viallet (1986) estimate that 
nationalized firms received an average premium of about 20 percent, although the individual 
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premiums for the 12 firms analyzed in this study ranged from - 3 percent to 44 percent. Although the 
determinants of the government-legislated takeover premiums were not the focus of this study, their 
results seem to suggest that the cross-sectional dispersion of premiums was related to unique 
characteristics of the nationalized firms. We argue that, among other factors, the dispersion in 
premiums can be related to the level of operational hedging properties (i.e., intangible assets) of 
nationalized firms.  
In this paper, we examine the above contention using the announcement period price 
reactions of U.S. corporations subject to forced changes in their foreign ownership and control 
structure by host countries.1 Using data for the 1965-1988 period, we show the existence of cross-
sectional dispersion in the valuation effects associated with the announcement of forced selloffs. 
This dispersion is inversely related to differences in the relative levels of intangible assets of the 
firm. Although the overall market reaction to such announcements is significantly negative, the 
negative reaction is observed only for firms with low levels of intangible assets. In addition, we also 
find a significant negative reaction for firms that opt to remain after being subject to external 
pressures, but not for those firms opting to completely withdraw from the hostile foreign country. 
Further examination reveals that firms that completely withdraw from the host country have 
significantly higher levels of intangible assets than firms opting to partially withdraw from the 
hostile environment. Hence, we argue that firms with high levels of intangibles are in a position to 
completely withdraw operations from such countries, with no concern for possible loss of revenues 
from such assets. We suggest that firms with high levels of intangible assets possess operational 
hedges that are capable of protecting shareholder value from the adversarial actions of host 
governments. Firms possessing high levels of intangibles can easily replace revenues lost in the 
                                                                 
1 Related literature on domestic voluntary selloffs include, for example, Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (1984), 
Jain (1985), Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987), and Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) among others. 
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hostile environment with revenues elsewhere and, therefore, protect shareholder wealth. On the 
other hand, firms with low levels of intangibles cannot easily replace lost revenues in hostile foreign 
environments. Such corporate weak trait should be reflected on firm's value. These firms, by 
selecting to remain in business-hostile environments, reveal their relative dependence on these 
foreign markets and lack of alternative business plans to cope with high country risk exposure. 
Furthermore, we show that the long-term financial performance of firms with high intangible assets 
marginally, but statistically insignificantly, improved relative to those with low intangible assets. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the decision and the valuation 
effects of firms with high and low intangible assets. Section III reports the data and describes the 
methodology. In Section IV, we analyze the abnormal returns for firms with high and low levels of 
intangibles, and show that firms with high levels of intangibles have a higher probability of opting to 
completely withdraw from the hostile country, whereas firms with low levels of intangibles opt to 
remain. We also examine the market's reaction to country-specific news released prior to firm-
specific withdrawal announcements, to check whether the market selectively anticipated the negative 
valuation effects for some firms (for example, those that completely withdraw at the firm specific 
announcement date), but not for others. This section concludes with the main results of the earnings 
performance analysis. Section V contains a summary of the results and our concluding remarks. 
II. VALUATION EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ASSET TRANSFERS 
A. Intangible Assets and Relative Foreign Involvement 
When faced with a strategic threat from a hostile local government, firms with high levels of 
intangible assets may be easily able to seek replacements for lost revenues elsewhere. 
Consequently, firms with high levels of intangible assets possess operational hedges that are 
capable of protecting shareholder value from the adversarial actions of host governments. For 
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instance, if firms possess relatively high levels of intangible assets, their operating losses in one 
country or region can easily be replaced by operating revenues elsewhere, with minimal depression 
in shareholder value. If a firm with extensive investments in intangibles is forced to withdraw from 
a hostile market, it may be better able to recoup its losses elsewhere. Other willing buyers provide a 
ready replacement market for the revenues lost in the hostile environment. For example, Gulf 
Resources …”in view of the Mexican government’s refusal to issue rulings that would enable the 
sale of (Gulf’s assets) to take place,… the company couldn’t permit the operations in Mexico to 
continue to affect profit and interfere with Gulf Resources’ growth in the U.S…” (WSJ, 1 
December, 1969). Here, the clear signal sent to shareholders is that a) the firm is not dependent on 
Mexican operations for sales and profits, and that b) it has growth opportunities elsewhere. 
Similarly, Bundy Corp’s decision to pull out of South Africa based on the fact that they had other 
“growth oriented business opportunities elsewhere” (WSJ, 12 August 1988) implies that they could 
easily replace revenues lost in South Africa. On the other hand, firms with low levels of intangibles 
cannot easily replace lost revenues, and shareholders value such firms accordingly.  Firms with low 
levels of intangible assets are strongly dependent on assets in place, and tend to lack contingent 
plans, global opportunities, or are faced with less favorable future cash flow opportunities to protect 
shareholder value. Such actions may also reveal the firm’s poor quality management. For example, 
the subsidiary of General Electric “reluctantly” yielded to government Mexicanization pressures by 
selling 10% of its total assets in a public offering. (WSJ, 7 May, 1963, p. 8). The ‘reluctance’ 
indicates that the firm is dependent on assets in place in Mexico. Clearly, the signal sent to 
shareholders is that it is somewhat dependent on Mexican operations for revenues and profit. 
Similarly, Gulf Oil, in reaction to a takeover of Gulf’s properties in Bolivia, indicated that they have 
been ”… negotiating in good faith as recently as last Wednesday and we hope that negotiations may 
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be resumed soon..” (WSJ, October 20, 1969). This suggests an undue dependence on assets in place. 
Atlantic Richfield said that …”it had begun arbitration proceedings in an effort to protect and 
preserve oil holdings the Algerian government has declared forfeit..” (WSJ, May 14, 1969).  
Anaconda’s chairman, in response to a desire expressed by the Chilean government for partial 
ownership of Anaconda’s copper mines in Chile, indicated that the firm was prepared to discuss… 
“procedures to meet at least in part, the government’s desire for greater participation..” (WSJ, May 
22, 1969). These examples illustrate the relative weaknesses of firms’ operating in a hostile 
environment. However, it is also possible that firms of either type may decide optimally, and choose 
to exit (or stay) if the benefits outweigh the costs.2 We argue that shareholders correctly identify 
high and low growth firms and value their shares accordingly. If this contention is correct, firms 
with high intangibles should experience a lesser reduction in firm value than firms with low 
intangibles. For such firms, management may feel compelled to retain a revenue base within the 
hostile environment. This would signal the firm’s dependence on the foreign country and its limited 
growth opportunities outside elsewhere (low levels of intangible assets). Clearly, shareholders 
interpret this signal properly, and recognize the reduced ability of these firms to appropriate rents 
from their intangible assets in the foreign country.  
III. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Sample Selection 
The sample used in this study comprises 143 forced firm-specific foreign withdrawal 
announcements of U.S. multinational corporations that appeared in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 
during the 1965-1988 period. To the best of our knowledge, nationalizations or threats by host 
countries were extremely rare and infrequent after 1988. When a divestiture announcement was 
                                                                 
2  We thank an anonymous referee for this alternative suggestion. 
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described in several articles of the WSJ, we used the earliest article to establish the announcement 
date. From this initial sample, we lost 29 observations because of contamination (two or more 
events at the same time), or lack of adequate daily returns data from CRSP tapes. After the initial 
screening, we were left with a total usable sample of 114 announcements. The sample also reflects 
diversity in terms of the nature of the forced divestiture. Based on keywords found in the WSJ 
announcement pages, approximately 43 of 114 sample cases were outright expropriations or 
nationalizations of firm assets in the foreign country, 21 of 114 cases represent instances where the 
U.S. firm is subject to strategic threats (imposition of local ownership laws, forcing firms to export 
more or import less, etc…), which does not culminate in outright expropriation, and 26 of 114 cases 
representing divestitures from South Africa, where the withdrawal was instigated by unpopular 
human rights policies favored by the foreign government, although strictly, the South African 
withdrawals cannot be considered as involuntary.34 The nature of the strategic threat for the 
remaining sample observations was unclear. Foreign host governments or government run 
corporations acquired 58.77% of the firms sold by U.S. MNCs over this 18-year period. Private 
foreign firms (current managers) acquired about 8.77% (5.26%) of the firms sold by U.S. firms. 
Thus, only 14.03% of the target assets were sold to the private sector. Of the remaining, information 
on the buyer was unavailable in 24.46 % of the cases, and 2.74% was sold to a combination of local 
private buyers, foreign buyers, and the local government. 
                                                                 
3 The 43 cases of outright expropriations cannot strictly be considered a signal for firm level strength. However, even if 
firms are forced to leave, it is our contention that strong firms (firms with high levels of intangibles) are batter able to 
survive an outright expulsion, whereas weaker firms do not. We show that investors are correctly able to gauge the 
strength of affected firms, and share prices react accordingly. We thank a referee for directing our attention to this 
important point.  
 
4 Firms may also choose to completely withdraw from foreign countries when residual stakes in the host country may 
harm business elsewhere due to blockage on government bids (Emhart Corp, from South Africa; 87/1/28), or because of 
shareholder complaints (Sara Lee Corp,86/10/31), or concern over loosing politically sensitive investors (Bell and 
Howell, 87/2/7). Since few such cases were identified in the sample, we do not explicitly control for such instances. 
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Our sample contains only those firms whose common stocks are listed in the New York or 
American Stock Exchanges, and included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
daily stock returns file. The sample was screened for contemporaneous announcements for a 5-day 
period prior to and after the announcement date. Firms with concurrent major corporate 
announcements (i.e., takeover activities, common stock repurchases, exchange offers, new security 
offerings and announcements of new contracts) for the ten-day period surrounding the 
announcement date were not included in the sample. This produced a net sample of 114 forced 
foreign divestitures. Table I shows the distribution of forced foreign withdrawal announcements by 
year and country over the 1965-1988 period. The average number of foreign divestments per year is 
6 with a maximum (minimum) of 13 (1). According to Panel B of Table I, the greatest incidence of 
foreign forced divestments occurred in South Africa (26), Chile (17) and Peru (14). The remaining 
announcements are evenly spread out among the other sample countries. Sample firms also reflect 
diversity in industry membership at the time of the divestiture announcement. 41 industries (4 digit 
SIC classification) are represented, with most cases in the Petroleum Refining industry (22 cases), 
followed by Aluminum Production and Financial Services (6 cases each) and Beverages (5 cases). 
[Insert Table I About Here] 
B. Estimation of Abnormal Returns 
The event date of each forced foreign withdrawal is the date of the announcement in the 
WSJ. We examine returns over the two-day interval (-1,0) using standard event study methodology 
described in detail in Brown and Warner (1985). Market model parameters are estimated using 
continuously compounded returns over the (-125,-6) interval using the CRSP value weighted index 
as a proxy for the market return.  Cumulative average abnormal returns are estimated over several 
intervals around the announcement day by averaging the abnormal returns for all firms in the final 
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sample. Finally, the significance of estimated abnormal returns is obtained following Dodd and 
Warner (1983). 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Abnormal Returns and Intangible Assets  
Table II (first column in Panels A and B) presents the daily average abnormal returns (AAR) 
for sample firms around the forced withdrawal announcement (-5,+5) date (Panel A), and the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs, Panel B) for selected intervals around the 
announcement date. For the entire sample, as shown in Panel A, the market’s reaction is 
significantly negative. These results are broadly consistent with the rent-seeking hypothesis (Meyer, 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992)) that predicts a negative valuation effect on shareholders' wealth. 
Though this evidence demonstrates the relevance of the rent-seeking hypothesis, we have not yet 
controlled for the influence of other factors such as the firm's level of intangible assets.  
The basic conjecture tested in this paper is that firms with low levels of intangibles 
experience a greater loss in firm value than firms with high levels of intangibles, and that 
shareholders can properly interpret the nature of a firm’s intangibles when it faces a politically 
hostile environment. To investigate the validity of this conjecture, we distinguish between sample 
firms on the basis of the levels of intangible assets (i.e., entrepreneurship, managerial ability, R&D 
and marketing capacity) by using the R&D plus advertising expenses to total assets ratio in the year 
prior to the foreign withdrawal announcement. A firm is classified into the high intangibles category 
if its (R&D + AE (advertising) Expense)/Total Assets ratio in the year prior to the withdrawal is 
equal or greater than the industry median.5 If the firm's intangible assets ratio is less than the 
                                                                 
5 To classify firms into high and low intangible asset categories, the industry median is used since intangible levels is 
industry specific. Results are qualitative unchanged when the sample mean, industry mean and median were used to 
classify firms into high and low intangible assets categories. Complete results are available upon request from the 
authors. 
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industry median, it is classified into the category of firms with low intangible assets. This 
classification procedure produced 49 firms with high intangibles and 57 firms with low intangible 
assets. 
Table II presents results for the high and low intangible asset firms. AAR (CAAR) results 
are reported in Panel A (Panel B).6 Firms with low intangible assets incur, on average, a negative 
announcement day abnormal return of 0.6028 percent, whereas firms with high levels of intangibles 
experience smaller (and statistically insignificant) announcement day abnormal returns. This 
conclusion is valid over a wide range of windows in the (-5,5) range, and in addition, the 
differences in valuation effects between the two groups are statistically significant. Hence, the 
evidence in Table II demonstrates that firms with low intangible assets experience the largest 
negative abnormal returns while firms with high intangible assets incur zero abnormal returns when 
they are forced to divest their foreign assets.7 
These results suggest that firms with low levels of intangible assets tend to experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns when they are faced with a hostile political threat, whereas 
firms with high intangibles experience no such reaction. These findings demonstrate that 
shareholders are able to correctly read the relative strength of affected firms. In the next section, it is 
shown that there are other interesting differences between the two groups of firms. Firms with high 
intangibles tend to be those that generally choose to completely withdraw. In contrast, firms with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
  
6 One of the other variables, namely the degree of relative involvement, RFI, also seems to be a significant discriminator 
between the complete withdrawal and the partial withdrawal sub-samples. We did perform event study analysis for the 
two groups of firms with low and high degrees of involvement, and were able to confirm that high (low) involvement 
firms suffered no loss (high loss) in market value around the announcement period. However, since we used many 
different definitions of RFI because of data availability problems, we cannot place a high degree of confidence on these 
results. 
 
7 This result seems to be consistent with Shapiro's [1989, pp. 383-84] conjecture that "becoming multinational is not a 
matter of choice but, rather, one of survival".  For firms with low intangible assets their foreign operating exposure is 
critical to their survival, and explains why they realize substantial losses when they are forced to divest their operating 
assets abroad or why they might be interested in keeping some of their foreign operating exposure (i.e., partial selloffs). 
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low intangibles generally opt to remain. It is argued here that these decisions made by firm 
management may be viewed as signals to shareholders that convey the nature of its intangibles.8 
[Insert Table II About Here] 
B. Partial and Complete Withdrawals Sub-samples 
Based on arguments made earlier, we suggest that strong firms (proxied by their level of 
intangibles) are more likely to completely withdraw, if they face a choice in this regard. Weaker 
firms may opt to remain, and may only partially withdraw. To test this contention, we classified 
divestiture announcements into two sets: (a) partial and (b) complete withdrawals. Complete 
withdrawals involve sales of all foreign operating assets to private, local government, or 
government owned firms, and complete severance of any kind of economic links with the foreign 
host country after the forced transfer of assets. It is suggested that some firms may select this option 
when faced with hostile threats, and send a clear signal to shareholders that it can easily restore lost 
market share through operations elsewhere.9 Partial withdrawals are defined as forced sales of a 
division or other operating assets of the parent firm in the foreign country where the seller continues 
to maintain a reduced operating presence, either by residual ownership of assets, or by retention of 
technical/commercial links in the foreign country, in comparison to the pre-crisis period. We 
postulate that firms that choose to remain signal their weakness by indicating its strong dependence 
on assets in place, and/or its lack of contingent plans or decreased global opportunities. Such action 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
8 One concern is whether the results are influenced by ‘clustering effects’. i.e., the presence of multiple announcements 
within a country within the same (-5,+5) interval. These could affect interpretation of the results because they violate 
the independence assumption. We checked the data for potential problems associated with clustering of data. Of the 114 
cases, we found 23 cases where 2 or more firms events occurred on the same event date. These firms account for 2% of 
the sample. We reran the major cross sectional regressions without these 23 firms. The results show remarkable 
similarity both in terms of estimates, but also the t statistics associated with these estimates. Complete results are 
available on request from the authors. We thank an anonymous referee for direction our attention to this issue. 
 
9 Alternatively, the decision to completely withdraw may also indicate a superior bargaining position relative to the 
foreign government. 
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may also reveal the poor quality of firm management. Table III presents a small sample (15) of such 
announcements to illustrate the basis for classifying firms into the two categories. In general, the 
WSJ articles were used to identify key words in classifying the divestments as complete or partial 
withdrawals.10 
[Insert Table III About Here] 
To examine whether the market's reaction to forced foreign withdrawals differs across the 
partial and complete withdrawal sub-samples, the event study analysis was repeated for both groups 
separately. From column 2 of Table IV (Panel A), it can be seen that U.S. multinational firms that 
partially withdraw from a hostile foreign country experience, on average, abnormal returns of -
0.4208 percent (-0.7112 percent) at the announcement day (day -1), indicating that stockholders of 
these firms realize a statistically significant loss. Similar conclusions hold true for the CAAR results 
presented in Panel B, particularly for the intervals (-1,0) and (-3,0).11 
In contrast, there is no evidence of significant abnormal returns, on average, to complete 
withdrawal announcements. The results reported in Panels A (AARs) and B (CAARs) of Table IV 
show that complete withdrawal announcements do exert a negative but insignificant influence on 
the firm's market value.12 Moreover, as indicated in the last columns of Panels A and B, there are 
statistically significant differences in announcement-period abnormal returns between the two sub-
                                                                 
 
10 An alternate procedure to differentiate between complete and partial selloffs would be to examine whether the parent 
firm continues to have subsidiaries in the host country after the realized forced divestiture announcement. 
Unfortunately, such information was generally unavailable for the time period used in this study. Finally, firms involved 
in both partial and complete foreign divestitures in a given year have been excluded from our sample. 
 
11 Divestitures in the sample are not clustered in the complete or partial withdrawal sub-samples.  For instance, 52.23% 
and 40% of the expropriation cases are associated with complete and partial divestitures, respectively. The threat cases 
associated with complete and partial divestitures are 28.57% and 17.5%, respectively. 
 
12 The average announcement day returns are not the result of a few outliers. Panel A of Table IV illustrates that more 
than 65 percent of the partial selloffs and 56 percent of complete selloffs exhibit negative excess returns at the 
announcement day. 
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samples. In addition, the negative abnormal returns for the overall sample are driven by the partial 
withdrawal group of firms. 
These findings suggest that firms that completely withdraw from a hostile environment tend 
to exhibit no significant abnormal returns around the announcement period, whereas firms opting 
for the partial withdrawal alternative suffer significant negative abnormal returns. These findings 
seem to be similar to those reported for firms with high and low intangibles. The question, then, is 
whether firms that completely (partially) withdraw are associated with high (low) levels of 
intangibles. 
[Insert Table IV About Here] 
To address this issue, it may be useful to examine a broad range of financial characteristics 
for the two groups of firms, namely, those that completely withdraw, and those that opt to remain. A 
wide range of financial characteristics during the fiscal year preceding the divestiture announcement 
are reported in Table V and include information about firms' intangible assets, relative foreign 
involvement (investment) in the host country, extent of multinationality, and the financial strength 
of firms engaged in complete and partial foreign divestments. The two groups appear to have 
similar characteristics with respect to various measures of financial structure, multinationality and 
performance with the exception of intangible assets (R&D plus advertising expenses) and relative 
involvement (investment) in the host country.  
A preliminary indication of the validity of the proposition that firms with high intangibles 
are more likely to conduct complete withdrawals, can be found when Table V is examined. The last 
column confirms that firms involved in complete foreign withdrawals tend to have higher levels of 
intangible assets on average and lower relative involvement than firms involved in partial foreign 
withdrawals, and these differences (both the means and medians) are statistically significant at 
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conventional levels.13 This provides preliminary evidence of a strong link between high (low) 
intangible assets and complete (partial) withdrawals. Interestingly, the results also indicate that 
advertising intensive (consumption oriented) firms are more likely to engage in complete rather than 
partial withdrawals. Hence, it can be argued that firms with high marketing intangibles are likely to 
withdraw voluntarily in an attempt to protect firm value from interest groups’ attacks (i.e., 
consumer boycotts). The possibility that firms may elect to withdraw from a country due to 
boycotting threats is more applicable in the case of South Africa than in other countries in our 
sample.14 In the next section, we examine whether these valuation effects found for the complete 
and partial withdrawal samples, are indeed due to differences in growth opportunities (i.e., level of 
intangible assets) between the two groups.15, after controlling for other potential factors that may 
account for these observed differences. These control factors are determined by past theory, and are 
also presented in the next section. 
[Insert Table V About Here] 
C. Determinants of the Foreign Divestiture Wealth Effects 
Our analysis demonstrates a negative wealth effect associated with forced foreign 
withdrawal announcements by U.S. corporations when they possess low levels of intangibles and/or 
when they elect to remain in the hostile foreign country despite threats. In contrast, shareholders of 
U.S. MNCs that posses high levels of intangibles and/or completely withdraw from a foreign 
                                                                 
 
13Moreover, further investigation of differences between the two types of foreign divestments with respect to financial 
strength, measured by Moody's bond rating, shows no discernible difference for firms announcing complete 
withdrawals compared to those announcing partial withdrawals. Fifty percent of partial foreign withdrawals and fifty-
five percent of complete withdrawals were made by firms rated Aa or higher.  
14 We would like to thank an anonymous referee, for this point. 
 
15 Alternatively, high growth firms (i.e., firms with high levels of intangibles) may have greater bargaining power with 
host countries than low growth firms, thereby generating higher prices (and less negative event period abnormal returns) 
for complete withdrawal. 
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country (because the host government imposes too many restrictions on them or creates an 
environment that is not conducive to private business) do not experience any losses. To confirm that 
firms adopting the complete withdrawal option tend to be firms with high intangibles, we regress 
abnormal returns on these measures and several other control variables.16 First, we introduce the 
partial versus complete divestiture variable, PCD, to test whether the foreign divestiture wealth 
effect is dependent on the level of operating exposure in the foreign host country. This is a zero-one 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a firm completely divests its assets in a foreign 
country and 0 when it undertakes partial divestment (i.e., maintains a fraction of its previous 
operating exposure in a foreign country). To capture the firm’s degree of foreign involvement, DFI, 
we include the ratio of its foreign sales to total sales in the year preceding the withdrawal 
announcement. A forced foreign divestiture may be more harmful if the divesting firm has a smaller 
multinational network, since this decision may reduce its ability to benefit from the arbitrage of 
cross-border imperfections among countries and internalize the value of its information-based 
intangibles through its international network.17 Next, we proxy the divesting firm's intangible assets 
using its R&D plus advertising expenses to total assets ratio in the year preceding the announcement 
(INA).18 This variable is designed to explore the links between the information-based intangible 
assets of the divesting firm and abnormal returns. A forced foreign divestiture is expected to have 
no valuation effects if a divesting firm has a strong technical and managerial know-how (i.e., 
                                                                 
16 We use the standardized abnormal return in the interval (-1,0) since most of the reaction to forced selloff 
announcements occurs during this period. Results are qualitatively unchanged when other broader intervals are used. 
These results are not reported here but are available upon request. 
 
17 This draws on the evidence of Doukas and Travlos (1988) and Doukas (1995) that shows a positive relation between 
firm value and the multinational network of the firm.  
 
18 Results are qualitatively unchanged when other proxies for intangible assets, namely the Tobin's q ratio, average 
R&D to total sales ratio over the three years preceding the announcement are used. Results are available on request 
from the authors. 
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intangible assets) background. The firm's intangible assets may also be viewed as a measure of its 
managerial performance (Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995)). If investors recognize that the firm is 
well managed based on the depth of its intangible assets, they would not interpret the divestiture 
announcement as signaling negative news about the firm's performance. In contrast, for divesting 
firms with low intangible assets, the fact that they choose to undertake a partial, as opposed to a 
complete withdrawal, conveys to the market negative information about the performance of the firm 
prior to foreign withdrawal announcements.19 We also introduce the relative foreign involvement 
variable (RFI) to account for differences in the degree of involvement in the hostile foreign country 
(see Table V) between the two subgroups.20  
The rest of the independent variables are designed to control for effects that may potentially 
account for the observed findings. First, we proxy the size attribute using the total assets of the firm 
in the year prior to the announcement (TA), since control for size also controls for possible 
differences in terms of growth opportunities between small and larger firms. Forced foreign 
divestments by small firms with high growth opportunities may signal a downward revision in 
growth expectations, leading to a large negative share price reaction. Next, we include an indicator 
variable, PNP, to investigate whether the valuation effects are related to characteristics of the buyer 
(i.e., PNP =1 for a government buyer, 0 otherwise) can account for the valuation effects. Finally, 
                                                                 
19 Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) document evidence of poor performance prior to domestic sell-off announcement. 
 
20 The RFI measures the firm's involvement in the host country relative to the size of the parent firm. RFI is available 
for 57 of 114 cases (50%), and is defined depending on data availability, as follows: Total assets in host country/ Global 
assets of firm (23 cases); Total sales in host country/Global sales of firm (19 cases); Total production in forced 
divestiture/Global production of firm (5 cases); and Price paid upon forced divestiture/Total assets of firm (10 cases).  
Host country, global production and price paid information were obtained from WSJ announcements while the rest of 
the information was extracted from annual COMPUSTAT tapes.  The terms ‘relative involvement’ and ‘relative 
investment stakes’ are used interchangeably. Since different measures were used to proxy this variable, we were unable 
to place a great deal of credence on the results associated with this variable. For this same reason, we do not present the 
results associated with differences in abnormal returns between high and low RFI firms. Following a referee’s 
suggestion, we examined the coefficient of correlation between the RFI and INA variables. The coefficient was 0.5076, 
p = .0007. Despite this high correlation, both variables are significant (equation 7, Table VI). These results indicate that 
both attributes are important. 
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four more indicator variables are used as control measures to investigate whether differences in 
sample characteristics are responsible for differences in abnormal returns. We introduce three 
dummy variables, respectively, EXP (1 = expropriation/confiscation, 0 otherwise), THR (1= threat, 
0 otherwise), and SAF (1 = indirect pressures to withdraw, 0 otherwise), to investigate whether the 
valuation effects were related to these factors. Finally, an OIL indicator variable (1= oil sector, 0 
otherwise) is introduced to examine if foreign divestiture returns are associated with the divestitures 
by 22 oil companies in our sample.21 22 23 
Table VI presents selected regression results to explain cross-sectional variation in excess 
returns associated with forced foreign divestiture announcements of U.S. MNCs.24 Tests of the 
regression residuals indicate no evidence of heteroskedasticity (White 1980). The first regression 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
21 The OIL variable was not significant. The specific results are:  
SCAR(-1,0) = -0.2532 + 0.0298 OIL, Adjusted R2 = -0.0094, Number of observations = 107,   
                       (-2.60**)    (0.13) (t values in parentheses). 
 
22 Following the referee’s suggestion, we introduced additional country dummies for the only other countries with large 
cases, Chile (17 cases) and Peru (14 cases). These dummies were not significant. For Chile, the results were: 
 
SCAR (-1,0) = -0.4732 + 0.112 CHILE DUMMY + 0.4685 PCD;   
  (-3.12) **     (0.321)                               (2.267)** (t values in parentheses). 
For Peru, the results were: 
 
SCAR (-1,0) = -0.4088 - 0.3950 PERU DUMMY + 0.4647 PCD;   
(-3.12) **   (-1.34)                              (2.234)** (t values in parentheses) 
 
These results indicate that the country dummies were not significant. In addition (results not reported), the 
significance of the PCD variables in the above regressions disappeared when placed alongside the INA variables.  For 
the remaining countries, such analysis was not performed, since they were 3 or fewer cases per country, and the results 
would not be meaningful.  
 
23  We also placed a natural resource dummy and reran the regressions. The results are as follows: 
SCAR (-1,0) = -0.2094 NRES + 0.4462 PCD, Adjusted R square = 0.0472. 
  (-0.988)      (2.252)** 
and, SCAR (-1,0) = -0.4719       -0.0849 NRES + 0.3220 PCD + 5.1692 INA , 
   (-2.252)**     (-0.35)            (1.503)             (2.714) ** 
(t values in parentheses) 
Adjusted R square = 0.0753; These results indicate that the abnormal returns are not a natural resources phenomenon. 
 
24 Because of space limitations, only selected regression results where significance is obtained, or which are central to 
the s tudy, are reported. Complete results are available from the authors. 
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confirms that foreign divestiture returns are significantly higher for firms that pursue complete 
rather than partial divestments. However, the impact of the PCD dummy variable disappears after 
the introduction of the INA variable, (regressions 2 and 5). The INA variable is significant at 
conventional levels and consistent with the evidence reported in the event studies. The significant 
intangible assets variable implies that well managed firms with high growth opportunities are not 
expected to be adversely affected by forced foreign divestment decisions. Alternatively, these 
results imply that firms with high intangible assets are likely to have greater negotiating power and 
therefore incur lower losses than firms with low intangibles. Finally, with the exception of the SAF 
variable, none of the other independent variables were found significant.25 26  
Overall, the regressions of Table VI suggest that, controlling for other seemingly relevant 
factors, divesting U.S. firms with low levels of intangibles experience the largest share price 
decreases following forced foreign withdrawal announcements. Clearly, such firms may have 
difficulty replacing revenues lost in the hostile foreign country through increased operations in other 
markets, and are therefore more likely to make an effort to maintain existing technical/commercial 
links with the host country. In contrast, firms with high intangible assets and a broad international 
                                                                 
25 The significance of the SAF variable disappears after introduction of either the INA or the RFI variables, indicating 
that INA and/or RFI are responsible for the significance of the SAF variable. In addition, both the EXP and THR 
variables seem to be dominated by the INA and RFI variables, suggesting that the latter variables drive the abnormal 
returns. For EXP, the regression results are as follows: 
SCAR (-1,0) = -0.3016 - 0.0628 EXP + 6.4446 INA;   
            (-2.22)**     (-0.304)       (2.434)** (t values in parentheses). 
For THR, the results are: 
SCAR (-1,0) = -0.3689 + 0.1072 THR + 6.9082 INA;   
            (-2.84)**  (0.483)            (2.866)** (t values in parentheses). 
These results suggest that the dominating factor driving abnormal returns is the INA variable. 
 
26 We also introduced another variable, REL to control for the degree of relatedness of the foreign subsidiary product 
category with the parent's principal product line. Based on industry descriptions provided by the 4 digit SIC codes, the 
sample observations were classified into related (REL = 1) and unrelated divestment categories (REL =0).  Description 
of business of the foreign divested units was obtained from the WSJ announcements, if available.  Of the 114 
announcements, 23 were classified as unrelated and 55 as related. The regression results show (not reported) that the 
coefficient of the REL variable is 0.0609 (with a t-value equal to 0.27) and statistically insignificant at any conventional 
level. Introducing the REL indicator variable in other key regressions did not materially alter the results reported in 
Table IX. 
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operating network do not appear to be sensitive to forced foreign divestments probably because they 
are able to appropriate returns associated with their intangible assets elsewhere and/or because of 
their increased negotiating power generated from possession of high levels of intangible assets.27 
[Insert Table VI About Here] 
D. Analysis of Country-specific News 
One potential problem with the evidence reported in the previous section is the possibility 
that the insignificant results reported for firms that possess high levels of intangibles (Table II and 
V) may be due, in part, to a possible market reaction before the official firm-specific announcement 
date. That is, for instance, at the time of a major political or country-specific announcement. To 
determine if this is the case, we first identified the announcement of major political events reported 
in the WSJ prior to the release of firm-specific announcements, and reran the event study 
regressions using country specific announcements.28 29  
Event study results, untabulated, from the country-specific announcements suggest that 
stock-price reaction to country-specific announcements is remarkably similar to those observed for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
27  At the suggestion of a referee, we conducted a logit regression which reinforces our main point. The results of a logit 
regression with the PCD dummy as the dependent variable, and INA as the independent variable provides us with the 
following results: 
PCD vs INA:       PCD =   -0.4831 + 16.3407 INA; Chi square = 6.715, p = .0093. 
            (p values)                  (.0997)     (.0186) 
 
Clearly, these results indicate that there is a higher probability that a firm with high intangibles will opt to completely 
withdraw. The significance level indicates that this result is not obtained by chance. 
We also used other independent variables (RSIZE, DFI, TOTAL ASSETS), but because of lack of data availability on 
all independent variables, the results were not as strong, because of limited overall sample observations available for the 
logit regressions. 
 
28 Alternatively, the observation interval could be extended to include the major political event. Unfortunately, for these 
types of events the interval could be months or years.  As a result, the change in firm value would be obscured by noise. 
 
29 Some examples of major country specific news items are: Argentina, 71/03/23, Deltec International Ltd, "Country's 
army overthrew President Roberto M. Levingston in a bloodless coup".; Chile, 70/09/08, Bethlehem Steel, "U.S. copper 
mining firms seen resigned to Marxist's win, nationalization in Chile"; and South Africa, 85/02/05, Bell and Howell, 
"The mood in Johannesburg, South Africa, is blue because of a stepped up call around the world for the end of apartheid 
in the country". The complete list of country specific announcements is available on request from the authors. 
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firm-specific announcements: the market reacts strongly negatively for firms undertaking partial 
withdrawals, but no significant market reaction is recorded for firms conducting complete 
withdrawals. These results are strongly consistent with those reported in Table II and V and suggest 
that rather than selectively anticipate for some firms, the market is remarkably consistent in its 
ability to anticipate the strength or relative involvement profile at the major country-specific 
announcement. Clearly, therefore, the lack of market reaction reported in Table III cannot be 
attributed to selective early anticipation for complete withdrawal firms on macro country-specific 
news. However, these results, coupled with the evidence reported in Table III suggest that while 
investors react to major country-specific news, their reaction is more pronounced at the time when 
firm-specific divestment announcements are made. It seems the latter announcements elicit greater 
market reaction because they reveal more accurately the vulnerability of the firm to national threats. 
In addition to examining the stock-price reaction to firm-specific news, we test for the market's 
response to country-specific news released for the country as a whole. The primary objective of this 
analysis is to investigate the relationship between market's reaction to country-specific and firm-
specific (divestiture) announcements along with a set of control variables describing the type of 
divestment, firm's intangible assets and its relative investment exposure in the host country. 
Accordingly, we regress the dependent variable, SCARiF [the (-1,0) CAAR at firm-specific 
announcement], against a set of independent variables, SCARiC (the corresponding CAAR at 
country-specific announcements), PCD, INA, and RFI (latter variables are defined earlier). If there 
is a country-specific response effect where firms with the greatest losses tend to experience the 
smallest subsequent abnormal returns around firm-specific divestment announcements, the 
correlation between SCARiF and SCARiC would be negative. However, if these variables are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
 20 
positively correlated, then any country-specific negative reaction is followed by a protracted period 
of relatively poor performance for the firm.  
Table VII reports results of different versions of the regression model described above. Tests 
of the regression residuals indicate no evidence of heteroskedasticity (White 1980). The most 
interesting finding is that SCARiF and SCARiC are positively and significantly correlated in all 
regressions. However, firm-specific divestment announcements also appear to play an important 
role in signaling valuable information about the divesting firm's investment opportunity set and 
bargaining power in the host country as indicated by the coefficient on the INA variable in all 
regressions. Consistent with our previous results, the PCD variable (complete-partial dummy), is 
positive and significant at conventional levels, indicating that average losses are significantly larger 
for firms engaged in partial foreign divestitures. The insignificance of the PCD variable in the 
presence of the INA variable, however, suggests that the losses from divestitures in foreign 
countries arise, not as a result of the partial divestments, from other factors such as the firm's low 
growth opportunities. The INA variable suggests that divesting firms with low growth opportunities 
are most likely to experience greater losses than firms with high growth opportunities. We show 
that this strength is related to the level of intangible assets and firm’s multinational network. 
[Insert Table VII About Here] 
E. Earnings Performance Changes Before and After Forced Foreign Withdrawal 
Announcements 
In this subsection we examine the earnings performance of firms in our sample in the years 
before and after the forced foreign divestiture announcements. If our contention is correct, then 
firms with low (high) levels of intangible assets should exhibit poorer (better) earnings performance 
both prior to and immediately following the divestiture announcement. To test this conjecture, we 
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study the parent firm's earnings performance two years before and after the divestiture 
announcement. Annual earnings per share (EPS), obtained from COMPUSTAT II files are used to 
measure divesting firms' earnings performance. The final sample consists of 100 firms two years 
prior to the divestment announcement and 77 firms two years after the announcement. These sample 
sizes reflect data availability on the COMPUSTAT II annual industrial files. Following Healy and 
Palepu (1988), the change in EPS for each firm over the (-2,2) year interval is expressed as a 
percentage of its stock price, Pi.  The standardized earnings change for firm i in year t is obtained as: 
D EPSit,  = (EPSit - EPSit-1)/Pi t = -2,...+2, where Pi is firm i’s stock price one fiscal year prior to the 
foreign selloff announcement. EPSit represents the annual earnings per share before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations for firm i in year t, estimated from: EPSit = IBEDit / (SHARE it * 
FACTORit) where IBEDit represents the income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations, SHAREit measures the number of outstanding common shares, and FACTORit is the 
cumulative adjustment factor for firm i in year t.30 To control for possible industry effects, EPS 
changes were adjusted for the industry median EPS change. The industry-adjusted standardized EPS 
changes for each sample firm are estimated as the difference between the standardized D EPS for 
each sample firm and the median standardized D EPS for firms in the same three-digit SIC code 
industry.31 
Standardized earnings changes for parent firms engaged in forced foreign withdrawals are 
documented in Table VIII for the entire sample and several sub-samples over the (-2,2) years-period 
surrounding the divestiture date. Table VIII reports raw, industry-adjusted, mean and median values 
for firms with high (low) levels of intangible assets. In general, for the entire sample, there appears 
                                                                 
30 The number of outstanding common shares (SHARE) was multiplied by the adjustment factor to adjust annual EPS 
data for all stock splits and stock dividends. 
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to be a decline in earnings performance both prior to and after the announcement. However, the 
sub-sample results provide some interesting observations. In particular, for firms with high levels of 
intangible assets, although the median raw returns are uniformly higher both prior to and after the 
announcement (Panel B), the industry adjusted median returns are not significantly different from 
zero. In contrast, the earnings performance results reported for firms with low intangible assets 
(Panel C), suggest that there is some evidence that these firms are poor performers relative to the 
industry median both prior to and after the announcement.32 Since these findings are not statistically 
significant, we conclude that we are unable to unequivocally show that low intangible firms exhibit 
poorer earnings performance. This is left as a puzzle for future research.  
[Insert Table VIII About Here] 
F. Robustness: Diagnostic Checks and Alternative Interpretations  
 We have interpreted the evidence in this paper along the idea that intangible assets have 
operational hedging properties against country risk (i.e., protect shareholder value from political 
threats). Namely, the operational hedging attribute of intangible assets implies that corporate cash 
flows are less likely to be location dependent. However, two additional questions emerge: (i) are our 
empirical findings sensitive to clustering effects within a given industry or country? That is, are the 
results driven by a particular industry (for instance, the resource industry), or multiple 
announcements within a country?,  and  (ii) are the results consistent with alternative 
interpretations? As far as the first point is concerned, it may be argued that the results are driven by 
industries with high intangible assets like chemical firms, utilities, etc. By measuring intangibles as 
deviations from industry median, we can rule out this factor. Similarly, the results are unlikely to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
31 Kaplan (1989), Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990), and Healy and Palepu (1990) use the industry median to estimate 
industry adjusted changes. 
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affected by clustering of political threats within a country. In our sample, three countries, namely, 
South Africa, Chile, and Peru account for 22.80%, 14.91 % and 12.28% of the sample cases, 
respectively. Diagnostic checks performed with and without firms with operating exposure in these 
countries suggest country clustering effects do not alter the major conclusion that the different share 
price reactions are related to the level of intangibles, and not to country clustering effects. 
Regarding the second point, it is possible that alternative explanations can account for the 
observed findings. For instance, our results are also consistent with the bargaining power view in 
the sense that intangible intensive firms are more likely to take a stronger stance against political 
threats and withdraw their foreign operations without any adverse valuation effects. The evidence, 
particularly for firms operating in South Africa, may be due to a “protection from boycott” effect. 
That is, advertising intensive (and marketing oriented) firms may be more likely to conduct 
“complete asset transfers” since such withdrawals may add firm value by impeding consumer 
boycotts..33 
These alternative explanations are not inconsistent with the operational hedge view we have 
proposed in this paper. Prior literature has used this proxy to capture a lot of different attributes 
(technology, managerial performance, growth opportunities etc..).The intangible measure can also 
accommodate the bargaining power and protection from boycott views.34 We have argued that firms 
with high intangible assets are strong, but we do not specify the sources of this strength. The 
literature has documented a strong positive correlation between intangible assets and Tobin’s Q. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
32 These conclusions generally hold even after controlling for other extraneous factors using "matched firm" criteria 
based on total assets in the year prior to the divestment. These results are not reported here but are available upon 
request. 
33 Cases where firms conduct complete withdrawals to prevent consumer boycotts may be considered as voluntary. 
However, we include this sample set here because the primary motivation for such withdrawals was due to local 
governmental actions that limit the strategic autonomy of operating firms. Thus, such cases could be viewed as 
involuntary.   
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The Q ratio can capture a wide range of attributes related to managerial strength, including superior 
bargaining or negotiating power, and superior performance. Hence, our operational hedge measure 
is broad enough to accommodate other aspects of hedging such as bargaining power and, therefore, 
explain why firms conduct complete withdrawals motivated by strength elsewhere within their 
system. However, if these threats can cause a system-wide loss of revenue, as may be the case when 
firms decide to remain in South Africa, then “pulling out” may be viewed as good news regardless 
of the degree of the operational hedging intensity of the firm. The question, then remains as to why 
less advertising intensive firms should suffer a price decline from complete withdrawals. 35  
We contend that the complete withdrawal of such firms is not driven by operational strength 
factors, but by concerns of system-wide loss of revenues. It is possible that less-advertising 
intensive firms have limited options to regain lost revenues elsewhere than other more advertising-
intensive firms. Examination of the South Africa sub-sample revealed that only 4 out of 17 firms 
that completely withdrew were less advertising-intensive in comparison to the industry median. The 
detailed analysis of such cases is left for future research. On balance, however, we find strong 
evidence in support of our contention that intangible assets possess valuable operational hedging 
properties as well. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the short- and long- term performance of U.S. multinational firms in 
response to forced transfer of their foreign operating assets to private and non-private foreign (host 
country) buyers over the 1965-1988 period. We document a strong negative reaction to such 
announcements during an 11-day window surrounding the announcement date. The most interesting 
result is that the market reacts significantly negatively only for firms with low intangible assets 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
34 Doukas, et. al.  (1999), also illustrate that the nature of intangible assets plays an important role for explaining in the 
the shape of firm’s  expansion and its multinational network structure as well. 
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and/or those that choose to maintain an operating link in the hostile foreign country (i.e., firms that 
elect the partial withdrawal strategy), but not for firms with high intangibles or opting for the 
complete withdrawal strategy. A closer examination reveals that firms that partially withdraw tend 
to possess low levels of intangible assets. Cross-section regression results on two-day abnormal 
returns suggest that this explanation dominates other explanations captured by selected control 
variables. Consistent with the short-term results, post-event performance analysis reveals that firms 
with high levels of intangibles tend to possess superior (but statistically insignificant) earnings (raw, 
industry median adjusted, and matched firm adjusted) when compared to low intangibles firms. 
These findings, while consistent with the rent-seeking hypothesis, show that high levels of corporate 
intangible assets can act as an operational hedge against nationalization, nationalization threats by 
hostile foreign governments, and country risk in general. While it is well known that firms with 
high levels of intangible assets prefer foreign direct investment, our results show that intangible 
assets have hidden properties of protection against country risk. Firms with low levels of intangible 
assets, however, should consider other forms of foreign involvement (i.e., joint venture) because of 
the limited hedging power of their intangible assets against country risk. In addition, our findings 
provide one set of rationalizations for the cross sectional dispersions in takeover premiums reported 
in the Langohr and Viallet (1986) study of French nationalizations. Future research may be directed 
at investigating whether firms with different levels of intangible assets were similarly protected 
during the recent Asian economic crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
35 We thank an anonymous referee for this important point. 
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Table I 
Distribution of Foreign Asset Transfer Announcements by Year and Country, 1965-1988 
 
 
A.  Annual Distribution of 
     Foreign Divestments 
 
 
 
B.  Geographical Distribution of 
     Foreign Divestments 
 
 
Year 
 
Frequency 
 
%  
 
  
Country 
 
Frequency 
 
%  
 
1965 
 
3 
 
2.63 
 
 
Algeria 5 4.38 
 
1967 
 
4 
 
3.50 
 
 
Argentina 2 1.75 
 
1968 
 
2 
 
1.75 
 
 
Bahrain 3 2.63 
 
1969 
 
10 
 
8.75 
 
 
Bolivia 2 1.75 
 
1970 
 
11 
 
9.64 
 
 
Canada 1 0.87 
 
1971 
 
12 
 
10.52 
 
 
Chile 17 14.91 
 
1972 
 
6 
 
5.26 
 
 
Ecuador 3 2.63 
 
1973 
 
3 
 
2.63 
 
 
Ethiopia 1 0.87 
 
1974 
 
13 
 
11.40 
 
 
Guyana 1 0.87 
 
1975 
 
10 
 
8.87 
 
 
Indonesia 3 2.63 
 
1976 
 
3 
 
2.63 
 
 
India 3 2.63 
 
1977 
 
5 
 
4.38 
 
 
Iraq 2 1.75 
 
1978 
 
3 
 
2.63 
 
 
Italy 1 0.87 
 
1979 
 
3 
 
2.63 
 
 
Jamaica 3 2.63 
 
1983 
 
1 
 
0.87 
 
 
Libya 3 2.63 
 
1986 
 
13 
 
11.40 
 
 
Liberia 2 1.75 
 
1987 
 
11 
 
9.64 
 
 
Mexico 3 2.63 
 
1988 
 
1 
 
0.87 
 
 
Morocco 1 0.87 
 
1965-1988 
 
114 
 
100.0 
 
 
Namibia 2 1.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicaragua 1 0.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria 3 2.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panama 2 1.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peru 14 12.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Puerto Rico 1 0.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa 26 22.80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 1 0.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Venezuela 6 5.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zambia 
 
2 1.75 
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Table II 
Abnormal Returns for Forced Foreign Asset Transfers of U.S. Corporations and Intangible Assets  
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARS) for the samples of the 107 Forced Foreign Asset Transfers of U.S. MNCs, 43 Partial Asset 
Transfers, 41 Complete Asset Transfers, the % of Positive AARs for all three Samples, the Z-values for the Daily Mean Difference of AARs 
between Firms with Low and High Intangible Assets for the Event Period  -5 Trading Days to +5 Trading Days Around the Initial 
Announcement (Day Zero) of Foreign Asset Transfers; 1965-1988 
 
Day 
 
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR, (%) 
 
Positive AAR (%) 
 
 
Z-difference 
AARLow - AARHigh 
 
 
 
Total 
Sample 
(N=107) 
 
Firms with Low 
Intangible Assets 
(N=57) 
 
Firms with High 
Intangible Assets 
(N=49) 
 
Total 
Sample 
 
Firms with Low 
Intangible Assets 
 
Firms with High 
Intangible 
Assets 
 
 
-5 
 
0.0853 
 
0.5522 
 
-0.4120* 
 
52.3 
 
64.9 
 
39.2 
 
2.54** 
 
-4 
 
0.1806 
 
0.1224 
 
0.3272 
 
48.6 
 
45.6 
 
52.9 
 
-0.09 
 
-3 
 
-0.2472 
 
-0.3889 
 
-0.0328 
 
41.1 
 
42.1 
 
45.1 
 
-0.07 
 
-2 
 
-0.0130 
 
-0.1044 
 
-0.0482 
 
45.8 
 
50.9 
 
39.2 
 
-0.09 
 
-1 
 
-0.3685 
 
-0.4570 
 
-0.1083 
 
46.7 
 
45.6 
 
51.0 
 
-0.49 
 0 
 
   -0.2998** 
 
 -0.6028** 
 
0.0008 
 
38.3 
 
31.6 
 
43.1 
 
-2.27** 
 
 1 
 
-0.2026 
 
-0.1213 
 
        -0.3305 
 
51.4 
 
52.6 
 
49.0 
 
0.91 
 
 2 
 
0.3783 
 
0.7555* 
 
-0.0371 
 
53.3 
 
54.4 
 
54.9 
 
1.10 
 
 3 
 
0.0830 
 
0.0200 
 
0.2091 
 
45.8 
 
45.6 
 
51.0 
 
-0.98 
 
 4 
 
-0.1405 
 
-0.3897** 
 
0.1297 
 
43.9 
 
35.1 
 
52.9 
 
-2.02** 
 
 5 
 
-0.2130 
 
-0.1668 
 
-0.2455 
 
48.6 
 
43.9 
 
52.9 
 
0.76 
 
B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Samples of the 107 Forced Foreign Divestitures of U.S. MNCs, 43 Partial 
Divestments (selloffs), 41 Complete Divestments (selloffs), the Z-values for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Firms with Low and 
High Intangibles for Several Window Intervals Around the Two-Day Announcement Period (-1,0) of Foreign Divestitures; 1965-1988 
 
 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, AAR, (%) 
 
 
Trading 
Interval 
 
Total Sample 
(N=107) 
 
Firms with Low Levels of Intangible 
Assets ( N=57) 
 
Firms with High Levels of 
Intangibles 
(N=49) 
 
 
Z-difference 
CAARLow – CAARHigh 
 
[-5 to 5] 
 
-0.7495 
 
-0.7808 
 
-0.5475 
 
-0.76 
 
[-3 to 0] 
 
-0.9284** 
 
-1.5330*** 
 
-0.1885 
 
-1.46 
 
[-2 to 2] 
 
-0.5056 
 
-0.5299 
 
-0.5233 
 
-0.38 
 
[-2 to 0] 
 
-0.6812** 
 
-1.1641*** 
 
-0.1557 
 
-1.65* 
 
[-1 to 0] 
 
-0.6683** 
 
-1.0597*** 
 
-0.1075 
 
-1.96** 
 
[-1 to 1] 
 
-0.8709** 
 
-1.1810** 
 
-0.4380 
 
-1.07 
 
[0 to 5] 
 
-0.3947 
 
-0.5051* 
 
-0.2734 
 
-1.45 
 
 
Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with the selloff as reported in the Wall Street 
Journal. 
(2) A sample firm is classified into the low intangible assets category if the (RND + ADV Exp)/Total Assets 
rates in the year prior to the selloff was less than the industry median, and into the 'high' category otherwise. 
(3) '***' ('**', '*') denotes significance at the < 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level. 
 30 
Table III 
 
 Selected Sample of Partial and Complete Foreign 
 Asset Transfers  
 
 
Parent Firm 
 
Wall Street Journal 
Event Date 
(year/month/day) 
 
Target 
Country 
 
Wall Street Journal Quotation 
 
Classification Code: 
C = Complete Asset 
Transfer; P = Partial 
Asset Transfer 
 
Dun and Bradstreet 
 
86/12/10 
 
South Africa 
 
"End all its business in South Africa. Dun and 
Bradstreet isn't taking a half hearted approach 
because it avoided signing licensing agreements for 
its products or maintain other ties..." 
 
C 
 
Coca Cola 
 
86/09/18 
 
South Africa 
 
"Coca Cola will arrange for concentrate to come 
from another source... The decision to divest was 
easier on coke than for other companies--it won't 
lose any money...its products will still be sold 
through independent bottlers in South Africa.." 
 
P 
 
American Brands 
 
87/05/11 
 
South Africa 
 
"...(the firm is)...ending company's presence in 
South Africa..." 
 
C 
 
Norton Co. 
 
87/03/04 
 
South Africa 
 
"...will continue to provide technical support and 
allow use of Norton's trademark..." 
 
P 
 
McGraw Hill 
 
87/02/27 
 
South Africa 
 
"...will end all operations in South Africa..." 
 
C 
 
IBM 
 
86/10/22 
 
South Africa 
 
"...will continue to supply products to the South 
African operation..." 
 
P 
 
ITT 
 
69/10/30 
 
Peru 
 
"...The (selloff) accord also provides for a 
continuation of the telephone expansion program in 
China.  ITT also agreed to invest $8.2 Million in 
luxury hotels and telephones..." 
 
P 
 
Grace and Co. 
 
69/06/26 
 
Peru 
 
"...The expropriation will not affect its industrial 
operation in paper and chemicals..." 
 
P 
 
Cerro Corp. 
 
69/06/26 
 
Peru 
 
"...The expropriation of agricultural operations will 
not affect its (Cerro's) industrial and mining 
operations in any way..." 
 
P 
 
Reynolds 
 
70/05/22 
 
Guyana 
 
"...Reynolds does not think that the government is 
seeking a controlling interest..." 
 
P 
 
Anaconda 
 
71/08/30 
 
Mexico 
 
"...Anaconda will keep 49%..." 
 
P 
 
Gulf Oil 
 
75/05/14 
 
Peru 
 
"...announced cessation of all Gulf Oil operations..." 
 
C 
 
IBM 
 
78/06/27 
 
Nigeria 
 
"...IBM is pulling out of Nigeria because of 
government law against 100% (foreign) 
ownership..." 
 
C 
 
Newmont Mining 
 
70/11/13 
 
Algeria 
 
"...government nationalization of Algerian 
propert ies (of Newmont Mining)..." 
 
C 
 
Coca Cola 
 
77/11/16 
 
India 
 
"...Coca Cola ceased Indian operations on India's 
request to disclose formula or cease operations..." 
 
 
C 
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Table IV 
Abnormal Returns for Complete and Partial Foreign Asset Transfers of U.S. Corporations  
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) for Firms with Complete and Partial Asset Transfers, the % of 
Positive AARs for Both Samples, the Z-values of the Daily Mean Difference of AARs Between Firms with 
Complete and Partial Assets Transfers for the Event Period -5 Trading Days to +5 Trading Days Around the 
Initial Announcement (Day Zero) of Foreign Asset Transfers; 1965-1988. 
 
 
Average Abnormal Returns, 
AAR, (%) 
 
Positive AAR (%) 
 
 
Day 
 
Complete 
Asset 
Transfer 
Subsample 
(N=41) 
 
Partial Asset 
Transfer 
Subsample 
(N=43) 
 
Complete Asset 
Transfer Subsample 
 
Partial Asset Transfer 
Subsample 
Z-difference: 
 AARComplete 
 – AARPartial 
 
-5 
 
-0.1363 
 
0.3148 
 
51.2 
 
53.5 
 
-0.60 
 
-4 
 
0.3667 
 
0.2624 
 
51.2 
 
51.2 
 
0.86 
 
-3 
 
-0.3488 
 
-0.2031 
 
29.3 
 
51.2 
 
-1.75* 
 
-2 
 
-0.1043 
 
0.0978 
 
36.6 
 
51.2 
 
-0.01 
 
-1 
 
0.1939 
 
-0.7112** 
 
61.0 
 
37.2 
 
1.96** 
 
 0 
 
-0.1548 
 
-0.4208** 
 
43.9 
 
34.9 
 
0.98 
 
 1 
 
-0.0240 
 
-0.2839 
 
53.7 
 
53.5 
 
0.49 
 
 2 
 
-0.0425 
 
0.8118* 
 
51.2 
 
51.2 
 
-1.55 
 
 3 
 
0.0046 
 
0.1286 
 
48.8 
 
34.9 
 
0.16 
 
 4 
 
0.2063 
 
-0.5936** 
 
53.7 
 
32.6 
 
2.14** 
 
 5 
 
-0.0961 
 
-0.3127 
 
46.3 
 
48.8 
 
0.41 
 
B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for firms with Complete and Partial Asset Transfers, the Z-
values for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Firms with Complete and Partial Asset Transfers, for 
Several Window Intervals Around the Two-Day Announcement Period (-1,0) of Foreign Asset Transfers; 
1965-1988. 
 
 
Trading 
Interval 
 
Firms with Complete Asset 
Transfers (N=41) 
 
Firms with Partial Asset Transfers 
(N=43) 
 
Z-difference 
CAARComplete – CAARPartial 
 
[-5 to 5] 
 
-0.1316 
 
-0.9100 
 
0.80 
 
[-3 to 0] 
 
-0.4139 
 
-1.2374** 
 
0.58 
 
[-2 to 2] 
 
-0.1281 
 
-0.5064 
 
0.83 
 
[-2 to 0] 
 
-0.0651 
 
-1.0343** 
 
1.69* 
 
[-1 to 0] 
 
0.0391 
 
-1.1320*** 
 
2.07** 
 
[-1 to 1] 
 
0.0187 
 
-1.4160*** 
 
1.97** 
 
[0 to 5] 
 
-0.1029 
 
-0.6706 
 
1.08 
 
Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with the selloff as reported in the Wall Street Journal. 
(2)  '***' ('**', '*') denotes significance at the < 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level. 
Table V 
 
 Firm Characteristics of U.S. MNCs Involved in Forced Foreign Asset Transfers; 1965-1988 
 
 
Complete Asset Transfers 
 
Partial Asset Transfers 
 
Firm Characteristics (in 
year prior to divestiture 
Announcement) 
 
Number of 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Range 
 
Number of 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Range 
 
t-difference in 
Means 
(Complete - 
Partial) 
 
Research and Development 
R&D Expense to Total Assets 
(TA) Ratioa 
 
40 
 
1.65% 
 
0.52% 
 
8.97% 
 
40 
 
1.34% 
 
0.42% 
 
6.57% 
 
               0.64 
 
Advertising Expense (AE) to 
Total Assets Ratio 
 
40 
 
2.36% 
 
0.0% 
 
18.47% 
 
40 
 
0.51% 
 
0.0% 
 
9.13% 
 
             2.46** 
 
(R&D + AE)/TA 
 
40 
 
4.02% 
 
1.44% 
 
18.47% 
 
40 
 
1.85% 
 
0.56% 
 
9.30% 
 
2.50** 
 
Foreign Sales to Total Sales 
Ratio 
 
20 
 
36.8% 
 
38.0% 
 
57.47% 
 
31 
 
32.0% 
 
33.0% 
 
54.5% 
 
             1.02 
 
Assets Size (Millions) 
 
39 
 
       9,842.55 
 
        3,650.6 
 
     69,031.58 
 
39 
 
     11,885.65 
 
       2,796.36 
 
     196,081.7 
 
-0.36 
 
Relative Foreign Involvement 
(RFI)b 
 
26 
 
1.36% 
 
1.00% 
 
10.95% 
 
25 
 
3.41% 
 
1.12% 
 
23.67% 
 
-1.61* 
 
Net Operating 
Income/Sales 
 
38 
 
0.1424 
 
0.1125 
 
0.8162 
 
38 
 
0.1162 
 
0.1025 
 
0.6906 
 
0.90 
 
Cash Flow/Sales 
 
30 
 
0.1195 
 
0.1057 
 
0.2366 
 
23 
 
0.0932 
 
0.1035 
 
0.2988 
 
1.32 
 
Sales/Total Assets 
 
39 
 
1.0683 
 
1.0543 
 
2.4815 
 
39 
 
1.0043 
 
0.9510 
 
2.0848 
 
0.60 
 
Working Capital/Total Sales 
 
38 
 
0.1499 
 
0.1430 
 
0.5021 
 
38 
 
0.1692 
 
0.1699 
 
0.4927 
 
-0.82 
 
Long Term 
Debt/Shareholders Equity 
 
38 
 
0.3437 
 
0.2738 
 
1.2785 
 
38 
 
0.5192 
 
0.2697 
 
3.7659 
 
-1.31 
 
Foreign Taxes/Total Taxes 
 
27 
 
0.1934 
 
0.5207 
 
8.2586 
 
23 
 
0.2678 
 
0.3012 
 
5.0226 
 
-0.20 
 
Total Employees (Millions) 
 
37 
 
0.1016 
 
0.0584 
 
0.8080 
 
37 
 
0.1079 
 
0.0510 
 
0.8334 
 
-0.17 
 
Notes: '**, *' denotes significance at the (5, 10%) level respectively. 
All Data are obtained form COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial Files.  Data definitions are as follows: 
Total Assets:  Data Item 6; Net Operating Income/Total Sales Ratio:  Operating Income After Depreciation/Net Sales; Cash Flow/Total Sales:  Income before Extraordinary Items plus Depreciation 
and Amortization/Net Sales; Sales/Total Assets:  Net Sales/Total Assets; Working Capital/Total Assets:  (Current Assets minus Current Liabilities)/Total Assets:  Long Term Debt/Shareholders 
Equity:  Total Long Term Debt/Total Common Equity; Foreign Taxes/Total Taxes:  Foreign Income Taxes/Total Income Taxes; Total Employees:  Data Item 29. 
aFor cases where R&D and/or advertising expenses are not reported in COMPUSTAT we assigned zero values if key financial information on the firm was otherwise available.  24 of 80 sample cases 
received such treatment.  The conclusions remain unchanged when we exclude these observations from the sample (see Morck and Yeung (1992) for similar treatment). 
bRFI measures the firm's involvement in the host country relative to the size of the parent firm. RFI is available for 57 of 114 cases (50%), and is defined, depending on data availability, as follows:  
Total Assets in Host/Global Assets of firm (23 cases); Total Sales in Host/Global Sales of firm's (19 cases); Total Production in Host/Global Production of firm (5 cases); and Price paid upon forced 
divestiture/Total Assets of firm (10 cases).  Host country, Global Production and Price paid information was obtained from WSJ announcements, and other information was extracted from Annual 
COMPUSTAT Tapes. 
 
Table VI 
 
Cross-Section Regression Analysis 
 
Estimated Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from Cross-Sectional Regressions of the Two-Day (-1,0) 
Announcement Period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns, SCAR-1,0 for U.S. MNCs at the 
Announcement of Forced Foreign Asset Transfers on the Type of AssetTransfers (PCD), the Degree of Foreign 
Involvement (DFI), the Intangible Assets (INA) of the Divesting Firms, the Relative Foreign Involvement (RFI) of 
the MNC in the host country and Several Control Variables; 1965-1988 
 
 
 SCAR(-1,0) = a + b1 PCDi +   b2  INAi +  b3 RFIi +  b4  SAFi +  et 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
a 
 
b1 
 
b2 
 
b3 
 
b4 
 
No. of 
observations 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
1 
 
-0.4948 
(-3.26)*** 
 
0.4529 
(2.27) ** 
    
84 
 
0.0475 
 
 
 
2 
 
-0.4062 
(-3.83)*** 
  
7.1946 
(3.13)*** 
   
102b 
 
0.0800 
 
 
 
3 
 
-0.1094 
(-0.75) 
   
-7.5148 
(-2.58)** 
  
55 
 
0.0952 
 
 
 
4 
 
-0.3450 
(-3.48)*** 
 
    
0.4010 
(1.99)** 
 
107 
 
0.0272 
 
5 
 
-0.5129 
(-3.40)*** 
 
 
0.3142 
(1.49)_ 
 
5.6680 
(2.15)** 
   
79 
 
0.0860 
 
6 
 
-0.3390 
(-1.54) 
 
 
0.3963 
(1.43) 
  
-6.3739 
(-2.05)* 
  
51 
 
0.1072 
 
7 
 
-0.4028 
(-2.21)** 
 
  
8.3309 
(2.63)** 
 
-5.8318 
(-2.05)** 
  
54 
 
0.1901 
 
8 
 
-0.4104 
(-3.78)*** 
  
6.9451 
(2.53)** 
  
0.0399 
(0.17) 
 
102 
 
0.0710 
 
 
 
 
 
aSCAR is the standardized cumulative abnormal return during the announcement period of day -1 to day 0. 
 
PCD is a zero-one dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when a firm completely transfers its assets its involvement 
in a foreign country and 0 when it undertakes partial asset transfer (i.e., maintaining a fraction of its previous operating 
structure in a foreign country). 
 
INA is the Research and Development plus Advertising Expenses to Total Assets Ratio in the year prior to the divestiture 
announcement. 
 
RFI measures the seller's involvement in the host country relative to the size of the parent firm. 
 
SAF is assigned a value of 1 if the target country is South Africa, and a value of 0 otherwise. 
 
bComplete information on R&D and Advertising Expenses were available only for 30 cases in the sample.  Equation (3) 
was reestimated using only these cases.  The coefficient of the intangible assets variable (INA) retained its positive sign and 
magnitude (i.e., 9.7619 (2.998)***).  Alternatively, for an additional 38 observations, R&D information, but no advertising 
expense information was available.  For these cases, treating the missing cases as zero and reestimating regression (3) 
produced similar results.  The intangible assets coefficient was found to be 8.850 (with a t-value of 3.992) and highly 
significant.  For an additional 5 cases, R&D information was missing, but advertising expense information was not.  
Estimation of regression (3) treating the missing R&D values as zero again produced similar results.  Finally, reestimation 
of the other regressions using only the cases of nonmissing data on R&D and advertising expenses produced similar results, 
and the estimation from these runs are available upon request. 
 
'***' ('**', '*') denotes significance at the < 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level. 
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Table VII 
 
 Regression Results Following Foreign Country-Specific News  
 
Estimated Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from Cross-Sectional Regressions of the Two-Day (-1,0) Firm-specific 
Announcement Period Standardized Abnormal Returns, -1,0
FSCAR  for U.S. MNCs at the Announcement of Forced Foreign 
Asset Transfers on the Two-Day (-1,0) Country-specific Announcement Period Standardized Abnormal Returns, -1,0
CSCAR   
Prior to the Asset-Transfer Announcement, the Type of Asset Transfer (PCD), the Intangible Assets (INA) of the Divesting 
Firms and the Relative Foreign Involvement (RFI) of the MNC in the host country; 1965-1988 
 
 
e + RFI  +INA   + PCD  + SCAR   = SCAR i432Ci10Fi aaaaa +  
 
Reg. 
 
a0 
 
a1 
 
a2 
 
a3 
 
a4 
 
No of 
Observations 
 
Adj. R2 
 
1 
 
-0.4175 
(-2.94)*** 
 
0.0857 
(1.516) 
 
0.6091 
(2.032)** 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
0.0543 
 
2 
 
-0.3650 
(-3.404)** 
 
0.1552 
(2.174)** 
 
 
 
6.7758 
(2.986)*** 
 
 
 
100 
 
0.1099 
 
3 
 
-0.1912 
(-1.299) 
 
0.1683 
(1.619) 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.0066 
(-1.010) 
 
55 
 
0.0310 
 
4 
 
-0.4994 
(-2.804) 
 
0.1640 
(1.671) 
 
 
 
9.1097 
(2.877)*** 
 
-0.9802 
(-0.513) 
 
55 
 
0.1511 
 
5 
 
-0.6667 
(-3.095)*** 
 
0.1750 
(1.715)* 
 
0.4066 
(1.498) 
 
7.8102 
(2.324)** 
 
-0.8144 
(-1.414) 
 
50 
 
0.1632 
 
Notes: 
'***'('**','*') denotes significance at the < 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level. 
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Table VIII 
Performance Changes Based on EPS Around Forced Foreign Asset-Transfer Announcements: 1965-1988 
 
A. All Firms  
 
Raw Earnings Changes 
 
Industry Adjusted Earnings Changes 
 
Year 
 
Number of Firms  
(Raw, Industry 
Adjusted) 
 
Mean (%) 
 
Median (%) 
 
Mean (%) 
 
Median (%) 
 
-2 
 
102 (98) 
 
-0.247 
 
0.089** 
 
-0.754* 
 
-0.134** 
 
-1 
 
102 (98) 
 
-0.057 
 
0.233*** 
 
-0.359 
 
-0.084 
 
0 
 
102 (98) 
 
1.606 
 
0.308*** 
 
1.303 
 
-0.065 
 
+1 
 
99 (95) 
 
-0.464 
 
             0.095 
 
-0.897 
 
-0.544** 
 
+2 
 
92 (92) 
 
0.366 
 
0.380*** 
 
-0.734 
 
-0.081 
 
 
B. Firms with High Levels of Intangible Assets 
 
Raw Earnings Changes 
 
Industry Adjusted Earnings Changes 
 
Year 
 
Number of Firms  
(Raw, Industry 
Adjusted) 
 
Mean (%) 
 
Median (%) 
 
Mean (%) 
 
Median (%) 
 
-2 
 
 50 (48) 
 
-0.546 
 
0.089 
 
-1.090** 
 
-0.284* 
 
-1 
 
 50 (48) 
 
-0.622 
 
0.217** 
 
-0.833 
 
-0.218 
 
0 
 
50 (48) 
 
2.569** 
 
0.463*** 
 
1.832 
 
0.005 
 
+1 
 
48 (46) 
 
0.049 
 
0.394** 
 
-0.896 
 
-0.574 
 
+2 
 
46 (44) 
 
-0.493 
 
0.391*** 
 
-1.483 
 
-0.253 
 
 
C. Firms with Low Levels of Intangible Assets 
 
Raw Earnings Changes 
 
Industry Adjusted Earnings Changes 
Year 
 
 
Number of Firms  
(Raw, Industry 
Adjusted) 
 
Mean (% ) 
 
Median (%) 
 
Mean (%) 
 
Median (%) 
 
-2 
 
52 (50) 
 
0.041 
 
0.075 
 
-0.430 
 
-0.106* 
 
-1 
 
52 (50) 
 
0.487 
 
0.458*** 
 
0.144 
 
-0.069 
 
0 
 
52 (50) 
 
0.679 
 
0.154** 
 
0.794 
 
-0.086 
 
+1 
 
51 (49) 
 
-0.947 
 
-0.113 
 
-0.899 
 
-0.309* 
 
+2 
 
50 (48) 
 
1.156 
 
0.311*** 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.052 
 
Notes: 
(1) Firms are classified into the High/Low intangible Assets categories as follows:  if the firm's R&D plus Advertising 
Expense Ratio in the year prior to the selloff is higher than (or equal to) the sample median, then we place the 
observation into the High category, and Low otherwise. 
(2) Change in earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued operations are standardized by firm's stock 
price one fiscal year prior to selloff announcement. 
(3) Year 0 is the first fiscal year following the selloff announcement. 
(4) Sample sizes are dictated by data availability on Compustat II annual industrial files. 
(5) Industry adjusted earnings changes for each firm represent standardized earnings changes less the median 
standardized earnings changes for all firms in the industry. 
(6) '***' ('**','*') denotes significance at the < 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level. 
 
